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BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION CONNESSED ED

WILLIAM A. MUNDELL Chairman JIM IRVIN Commissioner MARC SPITZER	Arizona Corporation Commission DOCKETED JAN 3 1 2002	AZ CORP COMMISSION DOCUMENT CONTROL
Commissioner	DOCKETED BY	
In the matter of:	DOCKETED BY Myse	DOCKET NO. S-03413A-01-0000
CLAY EUGENE LAMBERT 3711 East Minton Place Mesa, Arizona 85215 CRD No. 1959853,))))	STATE'S BRIEF RE: APPLICABILITY OF AUTOMATIC BANKRUPTCY STAY, 11 U.S.C. 362(a), TO THIS ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
Respondent.		(ALJ Philip Dion III)
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The Arizona Corporation Commission, Securities Division, hereby submits its brief to the Commission as previously ordered by the Administrative Law Judge and requests a finding by the Commission that the administrative proceedings against Respondent are not subject to the automatic stay in Respondent's bankruptcy case. This Brief is supported by the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

Respectfully submitted this 3/5/day of January, 2002.

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Arizona Corporation Commission

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. <u>BACKGROUND</u>

On September 26, 2001, the Arizona Corporation Commission, Securities Division ("Division") issued a Notice of Opportunity For Hearing against Clay Eugene Lambert ("Lambert") alleging fraud in the sale of unregistered securities to a Phoenix Valley couple, misappropriation of funds from the couple's business checking account, and other allegations. On October 3, 2001, Lambert requested that a pre-hearing conference and a hearing be scheduled.

On November 6, 2001, Lambert filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case in U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Arizona, Phoenix Division. On November 26, 2001, a pre-hearing conference was held. At the pre-hearing conference, Lambert through his counsel, argued that the administrative proceedings were stayed due to the automatic stay in bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(1). The Division argued that 11 U.S.C. 362(b)(4) exempts the administrative proceedings against Lambert from the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(1) due to the police and regulatory exceptions found in the section. At the pre-hearing conference, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") requested that both sides submit briefs on whether the Commission can proceed to a hearing against Lambert, and whether the Commission can order restitution, penalties, and suspension or revocation of Lambert's Arizona securities registration. After the hearing, the ALJ issued a written procedural order for each party to submit a brief on the issues listed in the previous sentence.

II. ARGUMENT

A. Administrative Proceedings Against Lambert Are Exempt From The Automatic Stay.

The filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of "the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against a debtor" 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). The general policy behind the automatic stay is to grant complete and immediate, albeit temporary relief to the debtor from creditors, and to prevent dissipation of the debtor's assets before orderly distribution to all creditors can be affected. S.E.C. v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65, 70 (C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2000), quoting Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267,

271 (3d Cir.1984). A main purpose of the stay is to protect the priority of payment to creditors. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 362.05[5][b] at 362-61 (15th ed. 2000).

Under § 362(b) certain proceedings are excepted from the stay. One of these exceptions is contained in § 362(b)(4) which allows:

The commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit . . . to enforce such governmental unit's . . . police and regulatory power, including the enforcement of a judgment other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by the governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's . . . police or regulatory power.

Section 362(b)(4) permits the government to initiate or continue an action under its police or regulatory powers without the restrictions of the automatic stay. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy § 362.05[5][b], at 362-58 (15th ed. 1996); In Re Universal Life Church, Inc., 128 F.3d 1294, 1297 (C.A.9 (Cal.) 1997). The reason for this exception is so bankruptcy does not become "a haven for wrongdoers, the automatic stay should not prevent governmental regulatory, police and criminal actions from proceeding." In Re Universal Life Church, Inc., 128 F.3d at 1297; 3 Collier on Bankruptcy § 362.05[5][a], at 362-54 (15th ed. 1996).

The legislative history of § 362(b)(4) indicates that when a governmental unit brings a legal action against a debtor in order "to prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay." S.Rep. No. 95-989 at 52 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5838; H.R.Rep. No. 95-595 at 343 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6299; In Re Universal Life Church, Inc., 128 F.3d at 1298 (emphasis added).

In determining whether certain actions taken by the government are taken to enforce the government's police and regulatory power, the courts have distinguished between actions taken to enforce laws affecting public health, welfare, morals and safety, on one hand, and actions to enforce the

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state's own pecuniary interests, on the other hand. <u>In re Dunbar</u>, 235 B.R. 465, 471 (9th Cir. BAP 1999); <u>In re Poule</u>, 91 B.R. 83, 86 (9th Cir. BAP 1988). While most government actions have some pecuniary component, particularly actions related to fraud detection and prevention, this pecuniary component will not abrogate the government's police power function; only if the action is pursued solely to advance a pecuniary interest of the government unit will the automatic stay bar it. <u>In re Dunbar</u>, 235 B.R. at 471; <u>In re Poule</u>, 91 B.R. at 86. The government's interest in punishing such misconduct as fraud and in preventing such future acts is a valid police and regulatory power. <u>In re Poule</u>, 91 B.R. at 86.

Some debtors in bankruptcy proceedings have argued that the governmental police and regulatory power exception did not apply to their case because the government was not "exercising authority under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," which, as they argue, is the only police and regulatory power remaining that is applicable after Congress recently amended § 362. Subsection (b)(4) of § 362 also applies to cases where the Convention Prohibiting Chemical Weapons is not involved. When Congress recently amended § 362, "... Congress merely expanded and/or redefined the previous police and regulatory power exceptions to include any organization exercising authority under the Convention Prohibiting Chemical Weapons." In re PMI-DVM Real Estate Holdings, L.L.P., 240 B.R. 24, 30 (Bkrtcy.D.Ariz. 1999).

B. The Commission Can Enter An Order To Cease And Desist, An Order For Penalties and an Order For Restitution Against Lambert

In the Notice of Opportunity For Hearing, the Division seeks a permanent Order To Cease And Desist, i.e., an injunction, against Lambert to prevent him from future violations of The Securities Act of Arizona. The Division also seeks penalties and restitution from Lambert for his violations of The Securities Act of Arizona.

In the bankruptcy case of <u>In re Charter First Mortgage</u>, <u>Inc.</u>, the Washington State Attorney General sought injunctive relief against the debtor, civil penalties and restitution of money on behalf of

the victims for alleged violations of the Washington Consumer Act. In re Charter First Mortgage, Inc., 42 B.R. 380 (Bankr.D.Or. 1984). The bankruptcy court concluded that it was appropriate for Washington to attempt to obtain an injunction and civil penalties for alleged violations of the Washington Consumer Act, but the state could not attempt to collect on a restitution order. In re Charter First Mortgage, Inc., 42 B.R. at 384. In the case of In re Poule, a registered contractor argued that revocation of his license and the civil fines imposed on him by the Registrar of Contractors of the State California violated the automatic stay in § 362(a)(1). In re Poule, 91 B.R. 83, 85 (9th Cir. BAP 1988). The court held that when a state agency imposes civil penalties on a debtor for fraudulent conduct or when the state agency is attempting to prevent future fraudulent conduct through injunctive relief, the action comes within the scope of § 362(b)(4). In re Poule, 91 B.R. at 87 (emphasis added).

Once a court determines that a proceeding is excepted from the automatic stay by § 362(b)(4), the court can allow the governmental unit to fix the amount of penalties, up to and including entry of a money judgment. S.E.C. v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65, 71-2 (C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2000). These cases and other cases hold that "anything beyond the mere entry of a money judgment against a debtor is prohibited by the automatic stay." Brennan, 230 F.3d at 71. This is consistent with language in § 362(b)(4), "... including the enforcement of a judgment other than a money judgment" Of course, the proceeding in which the money judgment is entered must be one to enforce the governmental unit's police or regulatory power. Brennan, 230 F.3d at 71.

Likewise, the Commission can enter a restitution Order against Lambert for his violations of The Securities Act of Arizona. However, like with penalties, the Securities Division cannot attempt to collect on the restitution order.

C. The Commission Can Suspend Or Revoke Lambert's Arizona Securities Registration

Just as the State Bar of Arizona's disciplinary proceedings and the suspension from the practice of law of an Arizona licensed attorney are excepted by § 362(b)(4), on the basis that they are an exercise of regulatory power by a governmental unit, the administrative proceedings against Lambert and the

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the automatic stay of § 362(a). In re Wade, 948 F.2d 1122, 1123-24 (C.A.9 (Cal.) 1991); Matter of Wade, 168 Ariz. 412, 423, 426, 814 P.2d 753 (1991). One day after Mr. Wade filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, the State Bar of Arizona initiated disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Wade for alleged violations of ethical rules. The United State Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, held that the disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Wade were excepted from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). In re Wade, 948 F.2d at 1124. The State Bar of Arizona suspended Mr. Wade's license to practice law and Mr. Wade appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Arizona. The Supreme Court of Arizona upheld Mr. Wade's suspension from the practice of law and commented that "There was, and is, no reason to stay respondent's disciplinary matter because of his bankruptcy petition." Matter of Wade, 168 Ariz. at 423.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit has upheld the revocation by the State of California of a contractor's license. <u>In re Poule</u>, 91 B.R. 83, (9th Cir. BAP 1988). The contractor filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Approximately three months later, the Registrar of Contractors of the State of California issued a citation against the contractor. After the citation was issued and the contractor failed to appear at a hearing, the Registrar revoked the contractor's license. Subsequently, the contractor filed a motion in bankruptcy court asking the court to set aside the revocation of his contractor's license. The debtor argued that the license revocation was void because the action was subject to the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay. The bankruptcy judge found, and the 9th Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, that ample grounds existed for revoking the contractor's license and the conduct of the Registrar was exempted from the automatic stay by section 362(b)(4) as a proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce police or regulatory powers. <u>In re Poule</u>, 91 B.R. at 85.

Based upon the holdings and reasoning in the two cases cited above, <u>In re Wade</u> and <u>In re Poule</u>, and the language in § 362(b)(4), the Commission can suspend or revoke Lambert's Arizona registration to sell securities. This is regardless of Lambert's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case and the applicable automatic stay.

D. The Commission Can Determine The Applicability of § 362(a) To This Proceeding

The court in which litigation is pending has jurisdiction to determine whether the proceeding before it is subject to the automatic stay. S.E.C. v. Bilzerian, 131 F.Supp.2d 10, 14 (D.D.C. 2001); NLRB v. Sawulksi, 158 B.R. 971, 975 (E.D.Mich.1993). The court in Bilzerian, as many other courts must do, had to first address whether the proceeding before it was affected by the automatic stay provision found in § 362(a). Bankruptcy courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction in determining the applicability of the automatic stay. S.E.C. v. Bilzerian, 131 F.Supp.2d at 14; In re Montana, 185 B.R. 650, 652 (Bankr. S.D.Fla. 1995); NLRB v. Sawulksi, 158 B.R. at 975. Therefore, the Commission has jurisdiction to determine whether the automatic stay applies to this administrative case.

Furthermore, the Arizona Attorney General provides expertise and advice on interpretations of laws, both federal and state, to state agencies. The Bankruptcy and Collections Section of the Attorney General's Office has knowledge concerning federal bankruptcy issues, particularly the applicability of § 362(a) and (b)(4). A memo setting forth the Arizona Attorney General's position on the automatic stay as it applies to administrative proceedings is attached as Exhibit "A."

III. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Division requests that the ALJ make a determination that the administrative proceedings in this matter are exempt from the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code, that the Commission can enter an order to cease and desist, an order for penalties and an order for restitution against Lambert, and that the Commission can suspend or revoke Lambert's registration to sell securities in Arizona. The Division acknowledges that any order entered against Lambert for penalties and restitution will be subject to applicable bankruptcy laws for purposes of collection.

1 2	Original and ten copies of the foregoing hand-delivered this 3/54 day of January, 2002 to:										
3	Docket Control Arizona Corporation Commission										
4	1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007										
5	A copy of the foregoing hand-deliver	red/n	nailed								
6	this 3/51 day of January, 2002 to:										
7	Philip J. Dion III										
8	Administrative Law Judge Arizona Corporation Commission										
9	1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007										
10	Michael Salcido										
11	Gust Rosenfeld P.L.C. 201 N. Central Ave., Ste. 3300									•	
12	Phoenix, AZ 85073-3300 Attorneys for Respondent		· · ·			:				•	
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ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL AGENCY COUNSEL DIVISION M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Administrative Law Judge

FROM: Robert R. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Bankruptcy and

Enforcement Collection Section

RE: Application of the Automatic Stay of 11 U.S.C. 362(a)

to administrative hearings

DATE: JANUARY 31, 200**1**.

This memorandum concerns whether an administrative hearing can proceed against a party who has filed a bankruptcy petition. It is the opinion of this office that the hearing can proceed provided that there is no attempt to enforce a monetary award against property of the bankruptcy estate. In reaching this conclusion, the following factors have been considered:

When a bankruptcy petition is filed, two significant events occur which alter the rights of both the Debtor and creditors. The first is the creation of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. §541. The estate consists of virtually all property rights of the Debtor. The second is the imposition of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. 362(a). This provision, with important exceptions, prohibits acts, which seek to collect debts against property of the bankruptcy estate.

11 U.S.C. 362(a) is modified by 362(b). The latter section states specific situations in which the automatic stay does not apply. The significance of this section is that the party seeking to enforce its non-bankruptcy rights does not need to seek approval from the bankruptcy court because the stay does not apply to the action the party is taking.

There are 18 separate provisions in 362(b). Of significance to this memorandum is 362(b)(4). This provision permits a governmental unit to commence litigation for police or regulatory purposes against a debtor and to enforce a nonmonetary judgement against the Debtor. The bankruptcy code and supporting case law differentiate the government's police power from its ability to collect on a debt (pecuniary power). Provided that the court's relief relates to the police power (injunction against future acts and the liquidation of damages) and does not involve an attempt to collect the damages (pecuniary action), the automatic stay does not apply to this proceeding. Since the automatic stay does not apply to this administrative hearing, it is appropriate for this court to continue its function.